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Abstract
Following Arnott and Gersowitz [1980] and DeAngelo and Masulls
[1980], this paper deals with corporate pension funding decisions as
part of the overall capital structure decision. A liability-based
model is derived in accordance with the assumption that the tax system
is in different ways biased in favor of both pension income and income
from equity securities. The conditions for obtaining optimal pension
policy for both whole economy and individual firms are derived. Four
analytical propositions for normative pension management also are
derived.
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I. Introduction
Extant theories of corporate pension funding policy offer two
different sets of implications for the management of pension funds. On
the one hand, firms should minimize their contributions to the fund and
maximize the investment risk of the contributed assets in a world of
incorrectly priced pension insurance premiums as shown by Sharpe
[1976]. Under Miller's [1977] model of capital structure, however, the
absence of marginal gains to corporate leverage results in an optimal
pension policy which is characterized by full funding and 100 percent
investment in bonds, as shown by Black [1980] and Tepper [1980], Some
application of these recommendations can be observed in the financial
community. For example, the recent willingness of pension funds to
provide debt financing for leveraged buvouts appeals to aspects of both
approaches (see Forbes [1984]). A few corporations, most notably
Chrysler, have even committed their pension investments fully to an
"All Bonds" strategy. Nevertheless, there is for the most part a wide
gap between theory and practice in the pension funding area. The
implications of the literature call for corner solutions of some sort,
while in practice firms subscribe to a continuium of funding
strategies. By investigating the implications of the joint effects of
insurance and taxes for optimal corporate strategy, Bicksler and Chen
[1985] have shown that optimal corporate pension strategy in both
asset-allocation and funding decisions can be a noncorner interior
solution.
This paper provides an alternate approach to the pension funding
problem which potentially avoids the extreme implications of most of
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prior models. A model is presented which integrates corporate pension
funding policy with the capital structure decision. By viewing the
unfunded vested liability as debt substitute, it will be shown that in
a world of differential taxation optimal corporate pension funding
policies exist which are unique to firms with different levels of non-
pension tax shields. The approach taken is thus a liability-based one;
whereas prior models have focused in the properties of pension assets as
part of the corporate entity, this analysis is concerned with the role
of the net vested liability in the financial structure. In the second
section, the assumptions and definitions of the model are explained.
The characteristics of the demand for pensions which follow from these
assumptions are discussed in third the section. The one period
valuation model and the supply function which it implies are explained
in the fourth section. Equilibrium with no tax shield risk is discussed
in section five. An optimal corporate pension funding policy under tax
shield risk is present in section six. The development of four
analytical proportions which are implied by the model is explored in
section seven. Finally, summary and conclusion remarks are indicated
in section eight.
2. Assumptions and Definitions
This model incorporates two instances of differential taxation which
contribute to the complexities of the U.S. tax system. The first and
simplest of these concerns the nature of the Social Security tax. Under
current law, a FICA (Federal Insurance Corporation of America) tax of
6.70% is levied against the first $38,700 of income earned in a given
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year. Employers are required to match the contribution of their labor
pool on roughly a dol lar-for-dollar basis. The statutes exclude pension
income from the F1CA tax base for both employers and employees. This
creates a preference for pension income which will be driving force in
the equilibrium process.
The second differential present in the model accounts for the
heterogeneous nature of the federal personal income tax. Individual
taxpayers are allowed to exclude 60% of their long-term capital gains
from gross income. If t(pd,i) and t(pe,i) represent the constant
marginal tax rates on debt and equity income for individual i,
respectively, this exclusion causes t(pd,i) > t(pe,i) V i. The relation-
ship between t(pd,i) and t(pe,i) creates a personal tax bias in favor of
equity investment which will ultimately constitute a constraining influence
in the model.
Some additional assumptions are made with regard to the tax system.
First, wage income, whether deferred or not, is subject to a flat income
tax of f%. This simplification has the effect of streamlining the
analysis, while preserving the components critical to a meaningful
result. The corporate tax rate is a constant t(c). Marginal tax rates
on investment income are assumed to be progressive in nature, with at
least one investor in each of the following mutually exclusive and
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exhaustive tax brackets:
Bracket 1 ( 1-f ) ( l-t(pd , i) ) > ( l-t( c) )( l-t(pe, i) )
,
Bracket 2 ( 1-f ) ( 1-t (pd , i ) ) = ( 1-t ( c ) ) ( 1 -t ( pe , i ) )
Bracket 3 ( 1-f ) ( l-t(pd , i) ) < ( l-t(c) )( 1-t (pe, i ) )
.
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At the end of the one period time frame, corporations are assumed to
receive state dependent operating earnings of X(s) in state s; X(s) is
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monotonically increasing in s with < X(S1) < X(S5). The face value
of debt (B), certain non-cash charges (D) such as depreciation and
depletion, and pension contributions required (P) are excludable from
taxable income. Firm specific tax credits of G dollars exist, but
consistent with the tax code only 9% of a firm's tax liability can be
offset by these credits.
There are two mutually exclusive and exhaustive groups in the economy:
capitalists and labor. Only capitalists may initiate firm formation and
maintain non-neutral investment positions. Accordingly, labor is the
only group which may sell its services. At the beginning of the period,
firms negotiate an agreement with labor, calling for the payment of w
dollars immediately in exchange for future services. Simultaneously,
firms issue E dollars worth of equity and B dollars worth of pure discount
bonds. The bonds issued are assumed to be riskless.
Corporations are assumed to recognize the debt substitution attributes
which unfunded liabilities possess. It follows that they limit the amount
of pure discount bonds which are issued, in order to employ unfunded
vested pension obligations in their capital structures. The precise
factors influencing the amount of pure discount bonds are exogenous to
the model.
Figure 1 illustrates the macro-structure of the model. The non-uniform
application of the F1CA tax encourages labor to seek deferred compensation
arrangements as a means of avoiding the Social Security tax. In this
model, labor can defer compensation by loaning (in pre-personal tax
PEASE I
Figure 1
DEBT INVESTORS
Promised services
PHASE II
FIRM Pension
claim
$ Loan-bac
LABOR
DEBT INVESTORS
Personal Debt
(backed by pension)
Fig' In Phase I, the firm sells debt and equity claims on its
after corporate tax cash flows. Phase II shows labor loaning
back wages to the firm in exchange for an unfunded pension
claim. This claim is then effectively sold in the capital
markets.
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dollars) all or part of Its current time wage w back to the firm. A
personal flat tax of f% and a FICA tax of s% are immediately paid on only
the amount retained by the wage earner. When the pension is received at
the end of the period, employees remit the personal tax of f% only.
Labor cannot by definition maintain a non-neutral investment position,
To offset the effect which the pension obligations have on their port-
folios, employees must sell personal debt. The amount of debt sold is
equal to the present value of their unfunded pension claims. At the end
of the period, when this personal debt matures, employees are assumed to
service their obligations with the after personal tax (only) pension
income which they receive.
In summary, employees contract for pensions by loaning pre-tax wage
income back to the firm in exchange for an unfunded obligation. Because
they cannot hold debt, they in effect end up selling their vested pension
benefits in the capital markets. The sale of these benefits allows for
the determination of an optimal level of pensions in equilibrium. On
the demand side, a constraint on the quantity of claims which investors
desire will limit the amount of deferred claims which employees demand
from the firm, given that they will request only what they can offset
with personal debt. Limitations on the supply of pension income offered
by each firm will then be shown to establish interior levels of unfunded
pension liabilities which are unique to each firm when non-pension tax
shields exist.
Following Alderson and Chen [1985], the relationship between
pension assets and the assets of a firm might more suitable be explained
by the separation hypothesis than the integration hypothesis. Hence,
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the model is constructed without explicit consideration of pension assets,
As such, the conflicting influences of Sharpe [1976] and Black [1980]
are not accounted for. The fact that all firms are subject to these
effects makes their exclusion unimportant, however, and allows the model
to explore other factors which affect corporate pension funding policy
Notation
t(pd,i) = the marginal tax rate on debt for investor i,
t(pe,i) = the marginal tax rate on equity for investor i,
Pd(s) = the current market price per dollar of debt income to
be delivered in the future state s,
(l-t(pd, i) )/Pd(s) = the after-tax yield on state s debt,
Pe(s) = the current market price per dollar of equity income
to be delivered in the future state s,
( l-t(pe, i) )/Pe(s) = the after-tax yield on state s equity,
X(s) = earnings in state s, monotonically increasing in s,
B = the face value of debt (fully tax deductible),
D = non-cash tax deductions,
G = the dollar value of tax credits,
t(c) = the statutory marginal corporate tax rate,
9 = the statutory maximum fraction of a firm's gross
tax liability which can be offset by tax credits,
P = the face value of unfunded pension benefits,
p(s) = the probability of a particular state s occurring,
s = the FTCA tax rate on earned income.
3. Aggregate Pension Demand and Differential Taxation
This section will deal with the mechanics of the demand for pension
income in the model. Perhaps more appropriately stated, it will explain
the demand for pension backed debt ("P-debt" by abbreviation), since the
amount of P-debt demanded by investors will determine the quantity of
pension income requested by employees. The market setting discussed
will consider only P-debt and equity claims because conventional
corporate debt, by assumption both riskless and insufficient to satisfy
total demand, is irrelevant to this analysis in a manner not unlike that
of municipal and Treasury issues. If bond is risky, then debtholder
claims outrank those of unfunded pensions in a liquidation. This case
will be considered in Section 6.
To begin, recall that t(pd,i) and t(pe,i) represent the constant
marginal personal tax rates on debt and equity income, for the i-th
individual. Since by assumption the personal tax code is biased so
that t(pd,i) > t(pe,i) > for all i, the state-contingent after
personal tax cash flow per unit of state s equity income exceeds that
per unit of state s debt income, so that (l-t(pe,i)) > (l-t(pd,i)) for
all individuals.
Let Pd(s) equal the current time (t=0) price in the market of one
dollar of pre-tax state s income from an investment in P-debt. Likewise,
Pe(s) will represent the current time market price of one dollar of
pre-tax state s income from an equity investment. Their reciprocals,
1/Pd(s) and 1/Pe(s), are pre-tax current yields; ( l-t( pd , i ) )/Pd(s ) and
( l-t(pe, i) )/Pe(s) are accordingly the after-tax yields to the i-th
individual. Utility maximizing investors will adjust their portfolio
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holdings of state s claims in order to maximize these after-tax yields.
In making their portfolio selection, investors will prefer P-debt to
equity if ( l-t( pd , i ) )/Pd(s) > ( l-t(pe , i ) ) /Pe( s ) ; equity will be preferred
to P-debt if the inequality is reversed; finally, the individual will
be indifferent between the two when their after-tax yields are equal.
The cross sectionally constant corporate tax rate is represented by
t(c), and the cross sectionally constant tax on wage income is denoted
by f. It is assumed that progressive personal tax rates are such that
at least one investor is in each of the following mutually exclusive
and exhaustive tax brackets:
B.l Debt Preferring ( 1-f )( l-t(pd, i ) ) > ( l-t(c) )( l-t(pe, i) )
,
B.2 Debt Indifferent ( 1-f ) ( l-t(pd, i ) ) = ( l-t(c) )( l-t(pe, i) )
B.3 Debt Adverse ( 1-f ) ( l-t(pd, i) ) < ( l-t(c) )( l-t(pe, i) )
.
It is assumed that investors are risk neutral and homogeneous in
their belief that each states will occur with probability p(s). In the
course of constructing a portfolio, every investor will select the
security of their tax preference (debt or equity) with the highest
expected yield. Given that all claims must be held in equilibrium, it
follows that the markets must set prices for its state contingent claims
so that pre-tax expected yields are equal. If PD and PE are the current
market prices of the pre-tax cash flows from debt and equity respectively,
this implies that p(s)/Pd(s) = 1/PD and p(s)/Pe(s) = 1/PE for all s.
DeAngelo and Masulis [1980] have shown that under these circumstances it
is possible to examine both (1) the P-debt and equitv demand decisions
of individuals, and (2) the pension and equity supply decisions of firms,
by examining only two markets: the one for pre-tax cash flows to equitv
-10-
(with current price PE) and the one for pre-tax cash flows to P-debt
(with current price PD). Let the superscript u denote investors who are
indifferent between investing in P-debt or equity. Exactly which
investors are marginal in this sense is established by the market prices
PD and PE, when they equate the pre-tax personal yields of P-debt and
equity for certain groups of investors. This occurs when, for
individual u
p(s)(l-t(pd,u))/Pd(s) = (l-t(pd,u))/PD
= (l-t(pe,u))/PE = p(s)(l-t(pe,u))/Pe(s)
Equivalence of after personal tax yields causes individuals to be
indifferent between investing their next dollar of capital in P-debt or
equity. Figure 2 illustrates the demand curve for P-debt. If it is the
case that PD > PE, then 1/PD < 1/PE, causing ( l-t(pd , i) )/PD < ( l-t(pe, i ) )/PE
for all investors. Clearly, under these conditions the demand for P-debt
is zero, since it is an inferior investment for everyone. If relative
prices are such that PE > PD(l-f) > PE(l-tCc)), investors in bracket 1
will demand debt cash flows, and marginal rates will be such that
(l-t(pd,i))(l-f) > (l-t(pe,i))(l-t(c)). Should PD fall relative to PE,
larger amounts of pre-tax debt income will be demanded in the aggregate,
causing the implied marginal personal tax rates to change correspondingly.
This is because as relative debt yields rise, the personal tax indifference
to debt is overcome for the most recent marginal investor, making that
individual debt preferring, and causing the investor with the least debt
aversion to become indifferent. When PD(l-f) = PE(l-t(c)), investors
in bracket 1 demand debt only and those in bracket 2, with
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Figure 2
p
D
d-f)
Market price
per unit of
before personal
tax P-debt cash
flow
P
E
(l-t(c))
max
P*
P-debt
Expected value of before
personal tax i'-dc'ot cash-
flow
Fig. 2. Market equilibrium in a 'pension funding, taxation, and
capital structure' ttorld; D = aggregate demand for
P-debt; sP
~debt
e aggregate supply for P-debt;
P* = equilibrium aggregate quantity of P-debt; P-^ E
aggregate quantity of P-debt supplied when all firms are
at the maximum P-debt level allowing full utilization of
all corporate tax shields. Equilibrium occurs at
P
D (l-f) > PE (l-t(c)).
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(l-f)(l-t(pd,i)) = (l-t(pe,i))(l-t(c)), are marginal. Finally, for
prices PD(l-f) < PE(l-t(c)), marginal investors are those in bracket 3
with (l-f)(l-t(pd,i)) < (l-t(pe,i))(l-t(c)); all other individuals
demand debt only.
4. Firm Valuation
This section describes the one period state preference valuation
model which will be used in the subsequent discussion of optimal corporate
pension policy. From this valuation model the supply function for pension
income emerges.
Let X(s) represent cash operating earnings before pension expenditures,
This variable is monotonically increasing in s, with X(S1) < X(s) <
X(S5) < °°. From X(s) certain non-cash charges (D), the interest expense
on bonds (B), and pension contributions (P) are deducted to arrive at
corporate taxable income. Firms pay a tax of t(c)% on taxable earnings.
They can offset their liability with any tax credits (G) which they
possess, subject to the limitation that the offset not to exceed 0% of
Q
the total liability. The firm specific variables B, P, D, and G define
the sub-intervals over the [SI, S5] range which describe the potential
pre-tax dollar returns which P-debtholders and shareholders face. Table
1 describes these returns, which will be referred to as D(s) and E(S),
respectively. In the first interval, [SI, S2 ] , the operating stream is
sufficient to compensate regular bondholders but insufficient or just
sufficient to pay the required amount to P-debtholders, who hold a claim
on the after-personal-tax pension income of labor. P-debtholders will
receive from zero to P dollars. The firm will pay no taxes, thereby
wasting all deductions and credits. Technically, s e [SI, S2]. When
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X(s) - B < P, or when X(s) < (P+B). If (B+D) < X(s) < (B+P+D) then
s E [S2, S3]. In this interval both regular and P-debtholders are paid
in full. No corporate taxes are paid, however, as earnings fail to
exceed total tax deductions. Excess deductions and all tax credits are
consequently unutilized. When
(P+B+D) < X(s) < (P+B+D + G/9t(c)), s e [S3, S4 ]
.
Table 1
State D(s) E(s)
51 - S2 [X(s)-B](l-f)
52 - S3 P(l-f) X(s)-B-P
53 - S4 P(l-f) X(s)-B-P - (l-9)t(c)[X(s)-B-P-D]
54 - S5 P(l-f) X(s)-B-P - t(c)[X(s)-B-P-D] + G
This interval is similar to the prior one except that the firm now has
earnings which exceed all available deductions, resulting in a tax
liabilitv which can be partially offset by available tax credits. The
limitation on the offset exists because the total credits available
exceed the maximum percentage of the gross liability allowed by law.
Thus, all deductions and a fraction of available credits are utilized.
In the final interval, when s e [SA, S5], the returns to both parties
reflect the full utilization of all tax deductions and tax credits by
the firm.
The optimal deferred wage occurs when the current time firm value is
maximized; that is, when the market value (V) of the claims of labor
(D) and equity (E) are greatest in total. D and E are valued by
discounting their cash flows in every state nature by the appropriate
state contingent unit price, Pd(s) and Pe(s), respectively. Thus,
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(1) V = D + E
S5 S5
V = / D(s)Pd(s)ds + / E(s)Pe(s)ds
SI SI
S2 S5
V = [ / (X(s) - B)(l-f)Pd(s)ds + / P(l-f)Pd(s)ds]
SI S2
S3
+ [ / (X(s) - B - P)Pe(s)ds
S2
S4
+ / (X(s) - B - P) - (l-e)t(c) (X(s) - P - B - D)) Pe(s)ds
S3
S5
+ / (X(s) - B - P - t(c)(X(s) - B - P - D) + G)Pe(s)ds].
S4
The objective of the firm is to select the P* value which maximizes
V. The appropriate first order condition as derived in Appendix A is:
S3
(2) 3V/8P = / (Pd(s)(l-f) - Pe(s))ds
S2
S4
+ / (Pd(s)(l-f) - Pe(s)(l-(l-6)t(c))ds
S3
S5
+ / (Pd(s)(l-f) - Pe(s)(l-t(c))ds.
S4
Equation (2) shows that the level of unfunded pension liabilities which
a firm possesses is relevant to valuation, because 3V/3P is not equal to
zero for all pension policies if D, B, and/or G are positive. This of
course implies that some values of P are strictly preferred to others.
Under the assumption that investors are risk neutral and have
homogeneous beliefs, equation (2) reduces to:
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S3
(3) 3V/3P = (PD(l-f) - PE) / p(s)ds
S2
S4
+ (PD(l-f) - (l-(l-6)t(c))PE f p(s)ds
S3
S5
+ (PD(l-f) - (l-t(c))PE f p(s)ds.
S4
In the aggregate, equation (3) represents the present value of the
expected corporate after-tax cash flow which results at the margin
when unfunded pension liabilities are substituted for equity in the
firm's financial structure. Further, this marginal present value
contains three distinct components whose magnitudes depend on the
degree to which the marginal pension deduction is utilized. The first
term, PD(l-f) - PE(l-t(c)), is the present value of the unfunded
pension for equitv substitution when the marginal corporate tax deduction
resulting from the increased pension liability is fully utilized. The
corresponding integral represents the probability of full utilization of
the marginal pension deduction. The second term, PD(l-f) -
PE( l-( 1-0 )t(c) ) , is a lower present value due to the partial loss of the
corporate tax shield caused by the statutory 9 ceiling on usable tax
credits. The corresponding integral is the probability of the partial
loss of the marginal pension deduction due to the 9 ceiling. Finally,
the third term, PD(l-f) - PE, represents the present value of the unfunded
liability substitution when available deductions already exceed total
earnings. The third integral is the probability of the total loss of the
deduction for the marginal pension.
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5. Equilibrium With No Tax Shield Risk
In order to show the contribution of this model to the body of pension
theory, this section will characterize market equilibrium in a way which
allows for the derivation of analytic results similar to those obtained
by Sharpe in his no insurance world. When there are no tax shields other
than the pension contribution, the partial or total loss of the marginal
tax benefits of sponsoring a plan is impossible. If D = B = G = 0, then
S2 = S3 = S4, and equation (3) reduces to
S5
(4) 9V/3P = (PD(l-f) - (l-t(c))PE) / p(s)ds
S2
Equation (4) allows for the derivation of the aggregate supply curve for
P-debt. Figure 3 illustrates this curve. If relative prices are such
that PD(l-f) < PE(l-t(c)), the 9V/9P < for all values of P, and the
firm will supply no pension income to labor. If PD(l-f) > PE(l-t(c)),
then 9V/9P > for all feasible pension decisions, and labor will
completely take the place of shareholders in the capital structure. If
PD(l-f) = PE(l-t(c)), 9V/9P = for all values of P, implying that the
firm is indifferent among all feasible P-debt-equity alternatives. The
supply curve is therefore perfectly elastic over the feasible set.
Summing across all firms, it follows that the aggregate supply curve is
also perfectly elastic at relative prices PD(l-f) = PE(l-t(c)). This
result is the same as that obtained by Sharpe in a no insurance world;
pension policy is irrelevant to firm value.
Turning briefly to the demand side, marginal investors must be in
bracket 2 at market equilibrium. As pointed out in section 3, marginal
17-
Figure 3
(l-f)Pj
Market price per
unit of pre-
personal tax
P-debt cash flow
P
E
(l-t(c))
P*
P-debt
P-debt
Expected value of
before personal
tax P-debt cash
flow
Fig. 3 Market equilibrium in a world with no corporate tax
shield substitutes. _?-debt _ . .D = aggregate demand for
P-debt; S = aggregate supply of P-debt; P* =
equilibrium aggregate quantity of P-debt. Equilibrium
occurs at Pn (l-f) « P_(l-t(c)).
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investors are those for whom after personal tax expected yields on P-
deht and equity are equal: ( l-t(pd,u) )/PD = ( l-l(pe,u) )/PE. When
PD(l-f) = PE(l-t(c)), marginal investors are in bracket 2 with tax rates
satisfying (l-t(pd,i) )( 1-f ) = ( l-t(pd,i) )( l-t(c.i)).
Substituting the marginal investor's tax rate condition PD =
PE( l-t(pe,u) )/( l-t(pd,u) ) into the marginal value of P-debt expression
(4) yields:
(5) 3V/3P[P*] = (PD(l-f)/(l-t(pd,u)) x
S5
[((l-t(pd,u)) - (l-t(pe,u)) (l-t(c)) ) / p(s)ds
S2
In equilibrium, the expression in brackets is zero, because marginal
investors are in bracket 2. The market in an intuitive sense endo^enously
determines the relative marginal personal tax rates on P-debt and equity
so that the corporate pension advantage exactly offsets the P-debt
disadvantage to investors, at any P-debt level.
The liability-based model therefore shows that pension funding policy
will be irrelevant to firm value when pension contributions are always
deductible. This is because at the margin, the constant corporate tax
advantage of providing more pension income is offset by the personal tax
disadvantage of doing so. While an optimal level of unfunded pensions
will exist in the economy, there are no individual optimums which obtain
that are unique to each firm. In this instance, the equilibrium
characteristics are the same as those of the asset-based models of Sharpe
[1976] and Tepper [1981]. The next section will explain how the
existence of non-pension tax shields affects the analysis.
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6. Tax Shield Risk and Optimal Corporate Pension Policy
When corporate tax shield substitutes exist (D, B, G > 0), corporate
pension policy is no longer irrelevant. Instead, relative market prices
will adjust until each firm has a unique interior optimum pension level,
in equilibrium. Similar to the previous section, there is a constant
expected marginal personal tax disadvantage to P-debt. The existence of
tax shield substitutes, however, causes the expected marginal corporate
tax benefit to decline as more pension income is contracted. At P*, the
expected marginal corporate tax benefit just equals the expected marginal
corporate tax benefit just equals the expected marginal personal tax dis-
advantage of debt. Unique interior optimums exist when firms have different
amounts of debt substitutes. (See Appendix B for mathematical proof.)
To begin, the aggregate supply curve for pension income will be
12
derived, under the assumption that the pension income stream is riskless.
When pension contributions are not the firm's only tax shield, both
individual and aggregate supply curves will consist of a perfectly
elastic section, after which they will smoothly slope upward (Figure 2).
The curve is perfectly elastic at relative prices PD(l-f) = PE(l-t(c))
over the levels of pension income which allow for the full utilization
of all corporate tax shields (D, B, G, and P). The supply curve is
upward sloping beyond the full utilization level because firms are
willing to supply more pension income to labor only if they are compensated
(for the greater likelihood of a partial or total loss of the additional
tax shield) with higher unit P-debt prices PD(l-f) > PE(l-t(c)). The
supply curve represents the schedule of (PD(l-f), P) combinations at
which the firm has unique interior optimum pension levels. In market
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equilibrium, the point at which the aggregate demand curve intersects
the aggregate supply curve (in its upward sloping section, under weak
assumptions on the personal tax code) sets relative prices
PD(l-f) > PE(l-t(c)). These prices in turn determine the unique
interior optimum pension policy for each firm.
A formal derivation of the supply curve proceeds as follows. When
D, B, and G > 0, S4 > S3 > S2 > 0, and the first order condition is once
again represented by equation (3). If relative prices are such that
PD(l-f) < PE(l-t(c)), 3V/3P < for all values of P, and the firm will
supply no pension income. When PD(l-f) = PE(l-t(c)), the supply curve
is perfectly elastic to the point where the selected pension contribution
just allows for the full utilization of all tax shields in every state
of nature. Referring to this amount of PMAX, and letting X(S1) represent
the lowest possible earnings, PMAX occurs when 9 times the gross tax
liability is greater than or equal to G. This is written in equation
form as:
9t(c)[X(Sl) - D - B PMAX] > G,
which, when solving for PMAX implies
PMAX = X(S1) - D - B - G/8 t(c) < X(S1).
When P is such that < P < PMAX, S2 = S3 = S4, because all corporate
tax shields are fullv utilized in every state of nature. The first order
condition reduces to:
3V/3P = PD(l-f) - PE(l-t(c)) for < P < PMAX.
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At relative prices PD(l-f) = PE(l-t(c)), the firm is indifferent to all
pension levels which allow for the full utilization of all corporate tax
shields. Consequently, the supply curve is perfectly elastic at relative
prices PD(l-f) = PE(l-t(c)) over the interval < P < PMAX.
No pension income will he provided beyond PMAX at relative prices
PD(l-f) = PE(l-t(c)). This is because when PMAX < P < X(S1), S4 > S3 >
S2. If PD(l-f) = PE(l-t(c)). This is because when PMAX < P < X(S1), S4
> S3 > S2. If PD(l-f) = PE(l-t(c)), 3V/9P < 0, because the second and
third terms are negative, while the first is zero. Firms will only
provide pension income beyond PMAX if 3V/8P > 0. In the context of
equation (3), this is possible only if PD(l-f) > PE(l-t(c)). From an
economic perspective, the higher pension price is necessary in order to
compensate shareholders for the loss of the corporate tax shield which
will occur on marginal units of pension contribution when se[S3, S4 ]
.
For all prices PD(l-f) > PE(l-t(c)), there exists a P* which sets
3V/3P = 0. As PD rises relative to PE, equation (3) will become positive,
and the firm will find it advantageous to supply more pension income.
The supply curve is thus smoothly upward sloping beyond PMAX.
Market equilibrium will occur on the upward sloping portion of the
pension supply curve, under a set of weak assumptions. First, the
perfectly elastic section of the supply curve must be short. This is
reasonable because there are few pension levels which are both riskless
to the employee and which have a zero probability of tax shield loss, as
the range < P < PMAX does. Second, investors in bracket 1 must be
sufficient in number to demand larger quantities of P-debt than PMAX
14
in the aggregate, at relative prices PD(l-f) = PE(l-t(c)). If both
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of these conditions hold, then the aggregate demand curve will intersect
the aggregate supply curve at relative prices PD(l-f) > PE(l-t(c)).
These prices will dictate a unique interior optimum pension policy for
each firm, and imply that investors are in bracket 1 with tax rates
satisfying (l-t(pd,i)) (1-f) > (l-t(pd,i)) (l-t(c)).
There is a duality relationship which exists between relative
market prices and relative personal tax rates. This relationship can
be used to intuitively show the trade-off which determines the optimal
pension policy. For the sake of simplifying the analytics, it is
assumed that t(pe,i) = t(pe,u) = 0, and that P* occurs over the range
PMAX < P* < X(S1). Evaluating the first order condition at P* and
substituting the simplified marginal personal tax rate condition PD =
PE/(l-t(pe,u)) yields:
(6) 3V/9P[P*] = (PD(l-f)/l-t(pd,u)) x
S5 S4
[t(c)( / p(s)ds + (1-e / p(s)ds) - t(pd,u)]
S4 S3
The first term in square brackets represents the expected corporate tax
advantage of an additional dollar of pension income substituted for
equity. Notice that this term is higher when the probability of losing
any or all of the marginal tax shield is lower. The second term in
square brackets, t(pd,u), quantifies the expected marginal personal tax
disadvantage of riskless P-debt. This is because under the simplifying
assumptions made, an increase in P of one unit raises the personal tax
liability by t(pd,u) in all states of nature. At low levels of pension
income, the first term exceeds the second term because there is a higher
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probability that the additional pension contribution can be fully
utilized to reduce the firm's tax liability, and investors purchasing
the corresponding P-debt are in the lower tax brackets. As the quantity
of pension income provided rises, so does the likelihood that any or all
1
8
of the marginal tax benefit will be lost. At equilibrium, the
declining marginal corporate advantage of pension contributions just
equals the marginal personal disadvantage of P debt. At P*, it is not
advantageous for firms to supply more pension income or for labor to
demand more.
The use of a one period model necessarily precludes the consideration
of the carryback and carryforward (CB-CF) provisions in the tax code.
The effect of the inclusion in a multi-period model is not difficult to
predict. Both reduce the probability that a corporate tax shield will
be lost. CB provisions allow any unused shields to be applied to reduce
the tax liability of up to three prior years. CF provisions allow the
firm to apply any shields which cannot be carried back to up to 15 years
in the future. Because both involve a time-value loss, however, they
reduce, but do not eliminate the expected value of the corporate tax
shield loss on the marginal unit of pension. Firms would therefore
require less price compensation for increasing the supply of pension
income. As a result, the supply curve in a multi-period model would be
more elastic in its upward sloping portion that the one presented here.
Finally, it should be noted that our analysis of pension policy can be
generalized to the case when corporate conventional debt is risky. When
corporate conventional debt is risky, the returns to the
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contributors of capital are described in Table 2, given that by law
debtholder claims outrank those of unfunded pensions in a liquidation,
Table 2
State Interval B(s) D(s) E(s)
51 - S2 X(s)
52 - S3 B X(s)-B
53 - S4 B P(l-f) X(s)-B-P
54 - S5 B P(l-f) X(s)-B-P-(l-e)t(c)(X(s)-B-P-D)
55 - S6 B P(l-f) X(s)-B-P-t(c)(X(s)-B-P-D + G
Following Table 2, the valuation expression can be written as
S2 S3 S6
V = / [X(s)Pb(s)]ds + / [X(s)-B]Pd(s)ds + / BPd(s)ds
SI S2 S5
S6 S4
+ / P(l-f)Pd(s)ds + / [X(s)-B-P]Pe(s)ds
S3 S3
S5
+ / [X(s)-B-P-(l-9)t(c)(X(s)-B-P-D)]Pe(s)ds
S4
S6
+ / [X(s)-B-P-t(c)(X(s)-B-P-D)+G]Pe(s)ds
S5
and the appropriate first order condition is
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S6
3V/9P = / [Pd(s)(l-f)-Pe(s)(l-t(c))]ds
S5
S5
+ / [Pd(s)(l-f)-Pe(s)(l-(l-0)t(c))Pe(s)]ds
S4
S4
+ / (Pd(s)-Pe(s) ]ds
S3
Under the special conditions of risk neutrality and homogeneous heliefs,
S4 S5
3V/3P = [PD(l-f)-PE] / p(s)ds + [PD(l-f)-PE(l-(l-9)t(c)) / (p(s))ds
S3 S4
S6
+ [PD(l-f)-PE(l-t(c))] f (p(s))ds
S5
The first order condition is of the same form as in the case of riskless
debt, but differs with regard to the probabilities of the respective
state intervals.
S2
This is because J p(s)ds > in the case of risky conventional debt,
SI
implying that the supply curve has a greater slope than when conventional
debt is riskless.
7. Development of Analytical Propositions
The integrated model of corporate pension policy and capital structure
presented in the previous sections demonstrates that in a equity biased
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world, the existence of corporate tax shield substitutes for pension
contributions implies an interior optimum pension policy which is unique
to each firm. The purpose of this section is to discuss four analytical
propositions which originate from the liability-based model derived in
this paper.
Let "a" denote a dummy parameter which represents G, D, t(c), or B,
and define T to be the total differential of an expression. Totally
differentiating the first order condition (equation 3) evaluated at P*
yields
:
_. 3QV/3P) 3P* 3f3V/3P) 3a .Td = r-^-r + —J s =3P* 3 a
= (3
2
V/3P 2 )3 2 V/3P3a)3a =
Solving for 3P/3a,
(3P*/3a) = -(3 2 V/3Pda) / 3 2 V/3P 2 ).
2 2
If the second order condition is satisfied (3 V/3P < 0), then the
sign of 3P*/3a is determined by the sign of the cross partial,
3 V/3Pda. From (2) it follows that:
3P*/dD = 3 2 V/3PdD = -6t(c) - Pe(S4) (3 S4/dD) - t(c)( 1-9 )Pe(S3) (3 S3/3 D) <
3P*/3B = 3 2 V/3P3B = 3 2 V/3PdD - [(1-f) Pd(S2) - Pe(S2)] 3S2/3B
3P*/3G = 3 2 V/3P3G = -9t(c) - Pe(S4) (3 S4/3G) <
3P*/3X(s) = 3 2 V/3P3X(s) = [(l-f)Pd(S5) - ( l-t(c) )Pe(S5) ] 3S5/3X(s) > 0.
The sign of the first derivative which is presented, 3P*/3D, is
unambiguously negative. This is because 9, t(c), Pe(S4), 3S4/3D, and
3S3/3D are all positive. The sign of the 3P*/3B term is uncertain,
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because under the equilibrium condition PE > PD(l-f) > PK(l-t(c)), the
term in brackets is negative. The sign of the expression will therefore
depend on the relationship between 3 V/3P3D and [ ( 1-f )Pd(S2)-Pe(S2) ]
.
The third derivative term, 3P*/3G, is always negative. Finally, because
3S5/3X(s) > and (l-f)Pd(S5) > (Pe(S5) ( l-t( c) ) , the 3P*/3X(s) term is
strictly positive.
These cross partial derivatives can be translated into three analytical
proportions
:
P. 1 Ceteris paribus , the level of unfunded pension liabilities which a
firm possesses will be inversely related to its quantity of investment
related tax shields, i.e., depreciation, depletion, and investment tax
credits. Within the framework of the model, firms will offer less
uncertain deferred compensation the greater the amount of competing
investment related tax shields which they are entitled to. This is
because the non-pension tax shields reduce the amount of operating income
which can be sheltered by the pension contribution. More competing tax
shields imply a greater risk that the marginal pension contribution will
not yield its full potential tax benefit, reducing the incentive to offer
pensions. It is expected that the capital-labor ratio of the firm would
have a direct bearing on this relationship, through its impact on wage-
depreciation substitution. This proposition can be combined with Arnott
and Gersowitz's f 19801 findings to investigate how investment and
production policies can affect the employment contracts.
P. 2.1 Ceteris paribus
,
in a cross sectional analysis of firms, the level
of unfunded pension liabilities will vary inversely with the quantity of
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2interest on conventional debt outstanding if 3 /3P3D < [(l-f)Pd(S2) -
Pe(S2)]. This condition from equation (2) will exist when the tax
advantage of the marginal pension contribution outweighs the cost
advantage of additional unfunded pension liabilities in the capital
structure.
P. 2. 2 Ceteris paribus , in a cross sectional analysis of firms, the level
of unfunded pension liabilities will vary directly with the quantity of
2interest on conventional debt outstanding if 3 /3P3D > [(l-f)Pd(S2) -
Pe(S2)]. This condition from equation (2) will exist when the tax
advantage of the marginal pension contribution is less than the cost
disadvantage of additional unfunded pension liabilities in the capital
structure. Propositions 2.1 and 2.2 might be used to modify the
empirical model used by Feldstein and Seligmen [1981], Lee, Wei and
Alderson [1983] and others.
P. 3 Ceteris paribus , the level of unfunded liabilities will be directly
related to the expected operating earnings (X(s)) of the firm before
depreciation and pension expense. The reason for this is obvious. Greater
levels of operating earnings provide a greater assurance that the full
tax benefits of the marginal pension will be recognized.
Equations (1) through (3) show that a key determinant of corporate
pension policy is the probability of full utilization of the marginal
pension contribution. Hypotheses P. 1 , P. 2, and P. 3 result from the fact
that the state intervals in equation (1) are defined by the parameters
B, D, G, 9, t(c), and P, as they relate to the state contingent variable
X(s). It is implicit in the first order condition (3) that an increase
in the right skewness of X(s) will also increase the probability of full
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utilization of the marginal pension contribution. A fourth proposition
might therefore be articulated as follows:
P. A Ceteris paribus , firms with relatively greater right skewness in the
distributions of their state contingent operating earnings X(s) will
19
possess a greater level of unfunded pension liabilities.
The possible influences suggested by the fourth proposition should
affect the implications of P. 3, since skewness and expected values are
positively correlated.
8. Summary and Conclusions
The bulk of research performed on corporate pension policy has
approached the issue from an asset-based perspective, concentrating on
the merits of contributing assets to the pension fund. The implications
of these models therefore tended to be of an extreme nature. Following
the precedent of Arnott and Gersowitz [1980], this paper has dealt with
the corporate pension funding decision as a part of the overall capital
structure decision. The liability-based model assumes that the tax system
is in different ways biased in favor of both pension income and income
from equity securities. The assumed environment leads employees to seek
deferred compensation arrangements with their employers. If employees
are assumed to sell their deferred compensation benefits in the capital
markets, the model shows that an optimal level of unfunded pensions will
exist in the economy. When firms have different amounts of non-pension
tax shields, an optimal pension policy will obtain for each firm, in
eaui librium.
The model offers an important contribution to the pension funding
literature because it justifies possible interior optimum funding levels
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in a value maximization framework. This result differs from prior
research, which advocated either full or restricted funding policies. A
pension policy model in terms of Senbet and Taggart [1984] and Brock
and Turnovsky (1981) models will be investigated in the future research.
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Footnotes
1. If progressive rates were to apply to wage income, individuals in
higher tax brackets would have less pension income, and would
consequently sell less P-debt. This would not reduce the total
amount of P-debt supplied, however, as long as the flat tax rate is
set at a level sufficient to collect the same dollar revenue as a
progressive tax system would.
2. The after-tax return from one dollar of pre-tax corporate income is
( 1-t (c) )( l-t(pe, i) ) to an investor who buys equity securities. The
comparable return to P-debt is ( 1-f )( l-t(pd, i) ) . The latter return
accounts for the fact that labor pays a flat tax before the loan of
f% on wage income which it receives at time 0.
The brackets are defined on the basis of the relationship between
the respective after-tax returns on P-debt and equity. The first
bracket consists of individuals whose personal tax rates, t(pd,i),
and t(pe,i), are such that the return from one dollar of pre-tax
corporate income is greatest when received through P-debt rather than
equity ownership. Bracket 2 individuals are indifferent to either
form of investment, because both P-debt and equity vehicles deliver
the same net dollar amount. Tn a similar vein, bracket 3 investors
prefer equity investment to P-debt because they pay less taxes on
pre-tax corporate income when it is received through equity.
3. In this model, operating earnings are defined as earnings before
interest, taxes, and pension expense.
4. There is a wealth of literature which rationalizes the conventional
debt decision in terms of prospective agency costs, management risk
preferences, and/or other non-tax motivations. In order to make the
point of this research more clearly, limitations on the amount of
bonds are attributed to these factors.
5. The assumption that labor offsets unfunded liabilities with personal
borrowing can be justified with a "Debt and Taxes" (Miller, 1977)
argument. If unfunded liabilities truly are borrowing, then they
should take up some of the limited capacity for debt holdings in the
economy. Assuming that employees sell personal debt in an amount
equal to the magnitude of unfunded liabilities is merely a means of
operationalizing the debt capacity absorption. One must also consider
the fact that labor negotiations are typically concerned with both
current and deferred compensation issues. From the standpoint of the
sponsoring firm, pension costs originate from two sources: normal
cost, that portion attributed to current services, and prior service
cost, the portion of benefits granted (1) for service prior to the
adoption of the pension plan (past service cost) and (2) as a result
of amendments to an existing plan. While annual contributions are
required to cover normal costs, prior service costs can be amortized
over a period of 30 to 40 years, depending on their origin. When
labor accepts an agreement granting pension benefits for past services
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(and/or increases thereof) which are currently unfunded, they are
presumaly doing so in lieu of cash wages, and as such are extending
credit to the firm. This credit has a cost, because underfunding at
the current time requires the firm to contribute a greater amount in
the future, to make up for lost interest equivalents. These tax
deductible interest equivalents are not unlike the interest expense
on conventional debt, justifying their treatment as such in the model.
6. Because financial liabilities are financial assets simultaneously, it
follows that unfunded obligations should be considered to absorb some
of the economy's limited capacity for debt.
7. In a world without differential taxation, the single price law of
markets requires that Pd(s) = Pe(s) in equilibrium. For otherwise
to be the case would introduce arbitrage profit opportunities in a
world with unlimited short selling, when differential taxes are
introduced, however, debt and equity securities are no longer perfect
substitutes. In the absence of mechanisms to remove the effect of
differential taxes, Pd(s) — Pe(s) is perfectly consistent with
equilibrium.
8. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as amended currently limits firm's
use of tax credits to $25,000 plus 90% of their pre-credit liability
in excess of $25,000.
9. The cash flows to P-debtholders are of course net of the flat personal
income tax paid by the beneficiaries. The total cash flow to labor at
time consists of two parts. The first part consists of their gross
wage less the present value of the loan and applicable taxes (a). The
second part comes from the proceeds of the personal debt which they
sell. That amount is equal to the present value of the expected
pension benefit after taxes (b). Defining the total of the two as L,
(a)
S2 S5
L = [ [w - [(X(s) - B) / p(s)ds + P / p(s)ds](l-f)PD](l-f-s)
SI S2
(b)
S2 S5
+ PD(l-f) [(X(s) - B) / p(s)ds + P / p(s)ds
SI S2
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If the labor markets are efficient, one might expect them to adjust w
for a given P so that a desired expected value of L was attained.
Differentiating L with respect to P and re-arranging,
S5
3L/3P = (l-f)(f+s)PD / p(s)ds > S5 > S2
S2
= S5 = S2
This shows that labor will never be worse off by loaning back funds
to the firm, because the process allows the firm and labor to effect
a transfer of wealth from the Social Security system to themselves.
10. It might at first seem odd that firms would want to maximize the
market value of P-debt. Further thought shows that this is quite
rational, since higher P-debt market values increase the potential
flow of funds from labor to the firm.
Note that in this model labor is assumed to pay the employer portion
of the FTCA tax. This assumption is justified by the fact that
employers can easily pass this tax on to employees in the form of
reduced wages.
11. Chapter 3 of Alderson [1] deals with the characteristics of the model
without the assumptions of risk neutrality and homogeneous beliefs.
12. As DeAngelo and Masulis point out, the personal tax disadvantage of
P-debt is constant only for riskless debt. When P-debt is risky,
equilibrium will still obtain in a unique interior sense, but the
explanation is that the corporate advantage of pension income declines
at the margin faster than the personal P-debt disadvantage. Further
the assumption that pension benefits are riskless is consistent with
the terms of ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act), which
established that corporations are liable for their unfunded
liabilities up to 30% of net worth.
13. Proof of supply curve elasticity can be found in Appendix C.
14. It is not unreasonable to expect these conditions to hold. First,
firms do default on their pension obligations and/or lose tax shields.
Also, bracket 1 investors should be relatively important in the U.S.
markets. This is because in the U.S. the corporate tax rate is 46%,
which implies in Miller's special case that all individuals with a
personal tax rate on debt of less than 46% would always prefer debt
when PD(l-f) > PE(l-t(c)).
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15. DeAngelo and Masulis point out that it is unnecessary to assume an
equity biased tax code, as long as the subset of investors in bracket
1 not having equity biased personal rates is small so that those
investors will never be marginal in their debt-equity decision.
Pd(s)(l-f) < Pe(s) will therefore imply disequilibrium.
16. This is Miller's special case in which the potential to defer capital
gains perpetually results in tax free equity returns.
17. When t(pe,i) > and S2 t 0, the first order condition evaluated at
P* becomes:
9V/3P[P*] =
S5
(PD(l-f)/l-t(pd,u)) [t(pe,u) / p(s)ds
S2
S4
+ (l-t(pe,u)t(c)) (1-6) / p(s)ds
S3
S5 S5
+ (l-t(pe,u)t(c)) / p(s)ds - t(pd,u) / p(s)ds
S4 S2
When t(pe,i) = and S2 = 0, p(s)ds = 1, and the expression reduces
to equation (6).
18. This can be shown by differentiating the term in brackets with respect
to P,
- 9 (d(S4)/3P)p(S4) - (l-6)(d(S3)/3P)p(S3) <
19. The fourth hypothesis deals with skewness because there is an obvious
link between the magnitude of the third moment and the probability
of the highest state interval. No such linkage can be established
with regard to the second moment without strong assumptions on the
form of the distribution of operating earnings.
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Appendixes
These appendixes provides detail on the mathematical techniques
used in the liability-hased model of corporate pension policy.
A. First Order Conditions
f(a,2)
If G = / g(a,x)dx, then
f(a, 1)
3G/3a = (3f(a,2)/3a) x g(a, f(a,2)) - (3f(a,l)/3a) x g(a,f(a,l))
f(a,2)
f 3(g(a,x)/3a)dx
f(a,l)
Accordingly, from equation (1)
3V/3P = (3(S2)/3P[(X(S2)-B)(l-f)Pd(S2)] - (3 (SI )/3P) [ (X( S 1 )-B) ( 1-f )Pd(s )
]
S2
+ Ods + (3S3/3P)[P(l-f)Pd(S3) + (X(S3)-B-P)Pe(S3)]
SI
S3
- OS2/3P)[P(l-f)Pd(S2)+X(S2)-B-P)Pe(S2] + / [Pd(s) ( 1-f )-Pe(s) ]ds
S2
+ (3S4/3P)[P(l-f)Pd(S4)+X(S4)-B-P-(l-9)t(c)(X(S4)-B-P-D))Pe(S4)]
- (3S3/3P)[P(l-f)Pd(S3)+X(S3)-B-P-(l-e)t(c)(X(S3)-B-P-D))Pe(S3)]
S4
+ / [Pd(s)(l-f) - (l-(l-9)t(c))Pe(s)ds]
S3
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+ (3S5/3P)[P(l-f)Pd(S5)+X(S5)-B-P-t(c)(X(S5)-B-P-D)+G)Pe(S5)]
(3S4/3P)[P(l-f)Pd(S4)+X(S4)-B-P-t(c)(X(S4)-B-P-D)+G)Pe(S4)]
S5
+ / [Pd(s)(l-f) - (l-t(c))Pe(s)ds]
S4
The state intervals are:
X(S1) B+P B+P+D B+P+D+G/t(c)9 X(S5)
Accordingly, (3S2/3P) = (3S5/3P) = 0, and all terms involving the limits
of integration cancel out. Therefore, the expression reduces to:
S3 S4
V/ P = / [Pd(s)(l-f)-Pe(s)]ds + / fPd(s)(l-f)-(l-(l-0)t(c))Pe(s)]ds
S2 S3
S5
+ / [Pd(s)(l-f)-(l-t(c))Pe(s)]ds
S4
B. Proof of Interior Solution
In order to show that an interior solution exists, the left and right
hand derivatives must first he examined. Evaluating 3V/3P at P = X(S5),
S5
3V/3PfP=X(S5)] = [PD(l-f)-PE] / p(s)ds <
S2
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when PE > PD(l-f) > PE(l-t(c)). Repeating the procedure at P=0,
S5
3V/3P[P=0] = (PD(l-f)-PE(l-t(c))] / p(s)ds >
SI
This shows that interior decisions strictly dominate corner solutions.
A unique interior optimum obtains if V is convex in P. Differentiating
(2) yields:
3
2
V/3P2 = 9t(c)PE(3S4/3P)p(S4) - ( 1-6 )t( c)PE(3 S3/3P)p( S3)
+ (PD(l-f)-PE)(3S2/3P)p(S2)
When pension benefits are riskless, then 3S2/3P = 0, causing the third
2 2
term to vanish and leaving 3 V/3P unquestionably negative, since 3S4/3P
2 2
and 3S3/3P > 0. If pension benefits are risky, the 3 V/3P < as
long as the first two terms dominate the third.
C. Proof of Supply Curve Elasticity
If SP is defined as the expected personal before tax cash flow
supplied as pension benefits, then the supply curve is upward sloping if:
3SP/3PD = (3SP/3P*)(3P*/3PD) >
That this is true can be seen be realizing that
S5
3SP/3P = / p(s)ds > 0.
SI
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Further, totally differentiating the first order condition when set equal
to zero and allows P* and PD to vary,
Td(9v/3P) = isssm 3p* + 8»^p) 3D . o
or d rU
Solving for 3P*/3P,
9P*/9PD = (3 2 V/3PD3P) / - (3 2 V/3P2 )
S5
= / p(s)ds / - (3 V/3P^) >
SI
Therefore, 3SP/3PD > 0, and the supply of P-deht is smoothly upward
sloping in PD(l-f).
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